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IN T'HE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE ST'A T'E OF UTAH 
JOHN T. CURNUTTE, 
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-Vs.-
UTAH GAS SERVICE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defend ant, 
ER1IA RANSDELL, doing business 
as THE LARIAT CAFE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
JUNE CURNETTE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-Vs.-
UTAH GAS SERVICE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant, 
ERMA RANSDELL, doing business 
as THE LARIAT CAFE, 
Defendant and Appellant. J 
Case 
No. 8971 
BRIEF OF AP·PELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This matter is before the Supreme Court by way of 
an intermediate appeal granted by the Court to the Appel-
lant, Erma Ransdell, in 18 separate cases. Since the 
appeal has been docketed, 16 of the 18 cases have been 
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disposed of and the appeals dismissed upon stipulation. 
The two remaining cases to be considered involve the 
claims of John T. Curnutte and June Curnutte, his wife. 
As stated in Appellant's Petition for an intermediate 
appeal, the cases involve actions to recover damages 
alleged to have resulted from an explosion which occurred 
at The Lariat Cafe in Monticello, Utah, on August 13, 
1956. Service of Summons was not obtained upon Erma 
Ransdell until after the issue of liability in respect to 
the Defendant Utah Gas Service Company had been de-
termined. On December 21, 1957, a jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the several Plaintiffs and against the De-
fendant Utah Gas Service Company to the effect that 
said Defendant was negligent, proximately causing dam-
ages and injuries to the several Plaintiffs. The extent 
of the damages of the Plaintiffs has never been tried or 
determined by the Court. 
The acts of negligence complained of by the Plaintiffs 
in each of the actions now before the Court are the same 
as those contained in the Sallie Sullivan Case, as follows: 
''V. That Defendant Utah Gas Service Com-
pany negligently installed its gas pipes and negli-
gently connected the propane gas lines at the said 
Lariat Cafe. 
"VI. That Defendants Erma Ransdell and 
Harold Ransdell, doing business as the Lariat 
Cafe, negligently invited the public into their place 
of business and negligently allowed gas to escape 
in their places of business. 
"VII. That the foregoing negligence of the 
defendants proximately caused the death of Theo-
dore Smith." (Tr. 2) 
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In her answer filed February 6, 1958, Appellant ad-
mitted the allegations of Paragraph V, but denied the 
allegations contained in Paragraph VI. Likewise, the De-
fendant denied the allegations of Paragraph VII and 
answered as follows : 
"7. Defendant admits that the negligence of 
the Defendant Utah Gas. Service Company proixi-
inately caused the death of Theodore Smith, but 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 
numbered VII.'' (Tr. 4) 
Thereafter Plaintiffs Curnutte filed Motions fot 
Summary Judgment ''on the issue of liability against 
the Defendant Erma Ransdell.'' At the hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs for the first 
time asserted that the negligence of the Utah Gas Service 
Company was imputed to the Defendant Erma Ransdell, 
and that by reason of the admission contained in her 
Answer as above set forth, Apellant had in law admitted 
her liability to the Plaintiffs. This argument was made 
notwithstanding the complaint contains no claim that 
Appellant was liable by reason of the negligent conduct 
of the Defendant Utah Gas Service Company. 
In answer to the foregoing argument Appellant 
pointed out to the lower court that her Answer had de-
nied the allegations of the Complaint with respect to the 
claim that she was negligent in any manner, and that, 
therefore, such a denial presented an issue of fact to be 
determined by the jury. However, for the purpose of 
a~oiding any confusion on the matter or misunderstand-
ing as to her position, Appellant moved to amend her 
Answer, as follows: 
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''IV. Answering Paragraph numbered IV, 
[V]Defendant admits that the Utah Gas Service 
Company negligently installed its gas pipes lead-
ing to Defendant's place of business, but other-
wise denies the allegations of said paragraph. De-
fendant further specifically denies that the said 
Utah Gas Service Company was negligent in any 
manner or in respect to any acts or conduct which 
the law might impute to Defendant Erma Ransdell 
or for which she might be held liable." (Tr. 15) 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was taken 
under advisement by the District Court as was Defend-
ant's Motion to amend her Answer. Thereafter, the Court 
rendered its judgment determining that "the Plaintiff 
do have and recover against the defendant Erma Rans-
dell, doing business as the Lariat Cafe, all damages 
suffered by her as a proximate result of the explosion at 
the Lariat Cafe in Monticello, Utah, August 13, 1956." 
(Tr. 17) At the same time the Court denied Defendant's 
motion to amend her Answer. {Tr. 19) This Court there-
after granted an Interlocutory Appeal from the order 
granting a Summary Judgment entered by the District 
Court." (Tr. 20) 
FACTS 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the legal issues 
iuvolvcd, we would like to giYe to the Court a brief state-
ment of the fncts gi,·ing rise to this litigation as contained 
in the depositions on file in the case and designated for 
transmittal to this court by the Respondents. The De-
fendant Utah Gas Service Company is a public utility 
operating under the direction and supervision of the 
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Public Service Commission of the State of Utah. Pur-
suant to authority granted by the Public Service Com-
mission, Utah Gas Service Company proposed to serve 
the inhabitants of Monticello, Utah, with natural gas from 
the company's transmission lines. Sometime prior to Au-
gust 13, 1956, a representative of the Gas Company ap-
proached Appellant Erma Ramsdell, who owned and 
operated the Lariat Cafe in Monticello, Utah, and asked 
her if she would like to convert over to natural gas. At 
that time Appellant was using propane gas for operating 
certain appliances in the cafe. Mrs. Ransdell agreed to 
accept the natural gas service from the Utah Gas Service 
Company, and it was agreed that the company "would 
have their man come down and put the rough-in pipe 
and then they would connect the appliances for us on the 
day we were closed which was Sunday.'' Nothing was 
said about what would be done, if anything, with the pro-
pane lines leading into the cafe. (Ransdell deposition, 
p. 23, 24.) 
The Gas Company sent its workmen down to rough 
in the piping which was completed on Saturday, August 
11, 1956, and the final installation was done the following 
day while the cafe was closed. The only thing Mrs. Rans-
dell was requested to do was to leave the door of the 
cafe unlocked so that the workmen could have access to 
the premises. (Ransdell deposition, p. 26, 27.) At the 
time of closing the safe on Saturday evening, the ap-
pliances which were being operated by propane were left 
in the same condition they were normally left on Satur-
day night, with just the pilot light burning under the 
coffee urn. (p. 28) 
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On Sunday, August 12, Mrs. Ransdell noticed the 
workmen engaged in the work of connecting the natural 
gas to the cafe and observed them going in and out, but 
otherwise knew nothing about what was going on. As 
testified by her, "I didn't know anything about the pipe 
work." (p. 29) Late on the evening of August 12, she 
made a final check of the cafe to see that everything was 
in readiness for the following day. She observed that the 
flame under the coffee was not burning high enough to 
keep the water at the temperature desired so she called 
and left word for the workmen to come in and check it 
the next morning. The next day someone did come and 
check the appliances but she had difficulty with the coffee 
urn keeping the water hot even after the check was made. 
( pp. 30-32) There was some difficulty experienced in ob-
taining sufficient hot water from the hot water heater and 
the cook called to have someone come down to check it, 
which was done. (p. 33) 
Mrs. Ransdell was at the cafe all day Monday except 
for approximately 15 or 20 minutes. During the day no 
employee or customer made any complaint that there was 
any odor of gas ; nor did l\frs. Ransdell observe any even 
though several trips were made to the basement area in 
the course of delivery of groceries. (p. 34, 35) 
In response to a leading question by counsel for Re-
spondents, Appellant confirmed that: ''There was nothing 
thoro to eause you any alarm or to give you any indica-
tion whatsoevt'r that there might be any kind of leak or 
:Illy means hy which gas might be escaping in your build-
ing.'' (Rm1sdell deposition, p. 35, 36) 
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Appellant was working in the cafe at the time of the 
explosion, which occurred during the height of the eve-
ning rush hour. She herself was very seriously injured 
and filed suit against the Gas Company claiming negli-
gence of the company in installing its gas lines and dis:.. 
connecting the propane lines at the cafe. The action by 
Appellant was thereafter compromised and settled by the 
Gas Company. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The points which are raised by Appellant in each of 
the cases before this Court are as follows: 
1. The alleged negligence of the Defendant Utah Gas 
Service Company cannot be imputed to Appellant Erma 
Ransdell as a matter of law. 
2. Under the pleadings of this case, Appellant has 
the right to a trial by jury on the issue of liability. 
3. The Court erred in refusing to allow Appellant to 
file a clarifying amendment to her Answer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF THE DE-
FENDANT UTAH GAS SERVICE COMPANY CAN-
NOT BE IMPUTED TO APPELLANT ERMA 
RANSDELL AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In discussing the above issue we must keep in mind 
that the lower Court's decision was made on a motion for 
summary judgment. Under Rule 56, U. R. C. P., subdivi-
sion (c) of this Rule provides in part as follows : 
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''The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be ren-
dered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.'' 
In discussing the role of a motion for summary judg-
ment, Professor Moore in his work on Federal Practice 
' Vol. 6, p. 2057, has this to say : 
''A summary judgment is a judgment in bar 
that results from an application of substantive 
law to facts that are established beyond reason-
able controversy. The purpose of the hearing on 
the motion for such a judgment is not to resolve 
factual issues. It is to determine whether there 
is any genuine issue of material fact in dispute; 
and, if not, to rendered judgment in accordance 
with the law as applied to the established facts, 
otherwise to deny· the motion for summary judg-
ment and allow the action to proceed to a trial of 
the disputed facts. The party moving for sum-
mary judgment has the burden of establishing that 
the material facts are not in dispute; and the func-
tion of his motion is analogous to the motion for 
directed verdict.'' 
In considering sneh a motion, the court must resolve 
n1t~' question against the moving party. As further 
stated h~T P1·ojessor Jloore,. (Ibid, p. 2123-2126): 
''The eourts are in entire agreement that the 
moving pnrty for summary judgment has the bur-
den of ~howiug the absence of any genuine issue 
as to all the material facts, which, under applic-
able principles of substantiYe law, entitle him to 
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judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the 
movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden 
the movant must make a showing that is quite 
clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real 
doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of 
material fact. Since it is not the function of the 
trial court to adjudicate genuine factual issues at 
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, 
in ruling on the motion all inferences of fact from 
the proofs proffered at the hearing must be drawn 
against the movant and in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. And the papers supporting 
movant's position are closely scrutinized, while 
the opposing papers are indulgently treated, in 
determining whether the movant has satisfied his 
burden.'' 
The only negligence alleged by Respondents in their 
Complaints against the Utah Gas Service Company was 
that the company "negligently installed its gas lines and 
negligently disconnected the propane gas lines at the said 
Lariat Cafe.'' As to such negligence there has been no 
determination made in this case as to what specific acts 
on the part of the Utah Gas Service Company were neg-
ligent in respect to the installation of its gas line and dis-
connecting the propane gas lines. The negligence might 
very well consist of any one of a number of acts with 
respect to the over-all operation of connecting the service 
line to the gas company's main line by reason of which 
the gas was allowed to seep along the service line and into 
the cafe. Or it could consist of improperly testing the 
lines which resulted in gas escaping from any one of the 
connections along the main line of the gas company or 
the service line leading from the main line into the Cafe 
where the attachment was made to the appliances. 
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Respondents have not contended that the appliances 
in the Cafe were improperly adjusted or connected or 
that they were dangerous or defective so as to allow gas 
to escape from such appliances and cause the explosion. 
On the contrary, the negligence complained of its the neg-
ligence of the gas company in connecting its gas pipes and 
disconnection of the propane gas lines at the Cafe. 
Respondents claim that because Appellant admits 
the negligence of the Utah Gas Service Company in dis-
connecting the propane line and in connecting its gas 
pipes, she has also admitted her negligence because, Re-
spondents urge, the negligence of the Utah Gas Service 
Company is imputed to Erma Ransdell as a matter of law. 
The fact that a jury has heretofore found that the De-
fendant Utah Gas Service Company was negligent would 
in no way be binding upon the Defendant Erma Ransdell 
since she has not had her day in Court and would still be 
entitled to have the matter heard and determined by a 
jury both as to her own acts as well as to any acts of the 
Utah Gas Service Company which it might be claimed 
would be imputed to her. Nor can it be ascertained from 
the verdict of the jury heretofore rendered what acts of 
negligence the jury found that the Utah Gas Service Com-
pany had committed. Thus Defendant Erma Ransdell 
maintains that she is entitled to haYe the jury determine 
whether there were said acts of negligence on the part of 
the Utah Gas Service Company in this particular case as 
would be imputed to her. 
Since the Respondents have at all times conceded 
that the Utah Gas SerYire Company was an independent 
10 
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contractor with respect to the work which it performed 
in connecting its gas lines to the appliances at the Lariat 
Cafe, it is difficult to see why the Respondents urge that 
the acts of such independent contractor would be imputed 
to the owner of the premises. 
With respect to the acts of an independent contractor, 
our Supreme Court has recently laid down the generai 
rule of law applicable to the liability of the owner of 
property. In the case of Morley v. Rodberg, 7 Utah 2d 299, 
323 P. 2d 717, the court held that the evidence sustained a 
finding that an automobile mechanic who was road test-
ing a car with the owner present in the vehicle was an 
independent contractor so that the owner was not liable 
for the negligent acts of the mechanic in the operation of 
the automobile. This determination is in accord with the 
general principle announced by Prosser on Torts, Second 
Edition, Chapter 5, Section 32, that "In the ordinary 
case, one who employs an indedependent contractor to do 
work on his premises may leave all responsibility to him, 
and is not liable for his negligence." 
The duty of the owner or occupier of premises toward 
a business invitee is well stated in Prosser on Torts, Seo-
ond Edition, Chapter 15, Sec. 78, as follows: 
''The occupier is not an insurer of the safety 
of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reason-
able care for their proection. He must not only 
warn the visitor of dangers of which he knows, 
but must also inspect the premises to discover pos-
sible defects. T'here is no liability, however, for 
harm resulting from conditions from which noun-
reasonable risk was to be anticipated, or those 
which the occupier did not know and could not have 
11 
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discovered with reasonable care. The mere exis-
tence of a defect or danger is not enough to estab-
lish liability, unless it is shown to be of such a 
character or of such duration that the jury may 
reasonably conclude that due care would have dis-
covered it." (Emphasis added) 
In 38 .Am. Jur. "Negligence," Sec. 96, the rule is sim-
ilarly stated: 
''The rule is that an owner or occupant of lands 
or building, who directly or impliedly invites oth-
ers to enter for some purpose of interest or advan-
tage to him, owes to such persons a duty to use 
ordinary care to have his premises in a reasonably 
safe condition for use in a manner consistent with 
the purpose of invitation, or at least not to lead 
them into a dangerous trap or to expose them to an 
unreasonable risk, but to give them adequate and 
timely notice and warning of latent or concealed 
perils which are known to him but not to them. 
Summarily stated, to the extent of the invitation 
given a property owner owes to an invitee the duty 
of prevision, preparation, and lookout. .An owner 
in occupation of the premises violates his duty to 
an inYitec when he negligently allows conditions 
to exist on the property which imperil the safety 
of persons upon the premises ... If there are hid-
den dangers upon the premises, he must use ordi-
narr care to gh~e warning thereof. The liability 
of the proprietor of a. hotel to his guests and of a 
t·d orPkeeper to his customers rests upon the fore-
g-oing- priuci pies. 
".1 s h c rcinbcfore stated, an owner or occupant 
of pr('miscs is not liabile as an insurer of the safety 
of persons whom he has invited to enter. H·is liar 
bility to them for injuries u'hich they 1nay sustain 
while 11pon his premises must be predicated up-on 
h£s ncgli_qence." (Emphasis added) 
12 
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Section 97 goes on to state: 
"The liability of an owner or occupant to an 
invitee for negligence in failing to render the 
premises reasonably safe for the invitee, or in fail-
ing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be predi-
cated upon a superior knowledge concerning the 
dangers of the pemises to persons going thereon. 
It is when the perilous instrumentality is known 
to the owner or occupant and not known to the 
person injured that a recovery is permitted. . . . 
Thus, a property owner is not liable for injury to 
one whom he permits to inspect the premises, with 
a view to leasing them, by an explosion of gas 
escaping from a pipe which an outgoing tenant had 
disconnected without shutting off the flow of gas, 
without the knowledge of the property owner or 
reasonable opportunity on his part to discover the 
fact." 
The case referred to in the above quotations is 
Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Comparny (Ky. 1920) 219 
S. W. 1066, 10 A. L. R. 238. 
In the Leonard case, Plaintiff was passing an apart-
ment house when he observed that a tenant was moving 
out. He obtained a key to the apartment from one of the 
people who were engaged in the moving operation. He 
then went to the general office of the Defendant and asked 
for permission to inspect the vacant apartment, which 
permission was given. Upon entering the apartment, he 
struct a match to find his way. An explosion occurred. 
Subsequent inspection revealed that the gas cock had been 
left on when the gas stove had been disconnected from 
the line. In an action by Plaintiff against Defendant for 
damages, judgment of no cause of action was rendered. 
13 
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On appeal, this judgment was affirmed, the court held that 
one who expressly or by implication invites another to 
come upon his premises for business is not an insurer, but 
owes to such invitee the duty of being reasonably sure 
that such invitee will not be subjected to danger and the 
owner must exercise ordinary care to keep said premises 
reasonably safe. Where the Plaintiff had permission 
from the Defendant to inspect the premises when the 
Plaintiff had not had a reasonable opportunity to ascer-
tain or determine that the gas had not been properly dis-
connected by someone in the employee or agent of the De-
fendant, the Defendant could not be held liable for dam-
ages resulting. 
In the annotation on this case, 10 A. L. R. 238, ap-
pears the comment that the Leondard Case is in accord 
with the general rule laid down by the authorities to the 
effect that an owner or occupant of property owes invitees 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to have his premises in 
a reasonably safe condition, and to give warning of any 
latent or concealed perils. 
Our own Supreme Court has laid down a similar prin-
ciple with respect to the duty of an occupier of premises 
to an invitee in several cases. In Johnson '· Cudalzy 
Pa(·king CVompany, 107 Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98, appears 
the following quotation: 
"rrhe best stntement of the liability of the OC-CU-
pier of premises toward an invitee ·which has come 
to our attention may be found in Bohlen, ''Studies 
in the Law of Torts,'' p. 183. The rule is· there 
stated as follows : 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'' 'The position of the ''business guest'' is 
somewhat better than that of the "bare licensee." 
While the owner is bound to disclose to both any 
defect of which he knows and which he should rec~ 
ognize as creating a risk of injury to either, he may 
assume that the bare licensee, knowing that the 
owner has no interest in his visit and, therefore, 
cannot be expected to have made special prepa-
rations for his coming, will be on the alert to dis-
cover for himself the true condition of the prem-
ises; while a business . guest, being entitled to 
expect to find the premises put in order for his 
visit, is not to be expected to discover defects 
unusual in a properly prepared business premises. 
And the owner having an interest in the "business 
invitee's'' visit, must by inspection ascertain the 
actual condition of the premises, so that ignorance 
due to a failure in inspection will not excuse his 
failure to give warning, while he owes no such duty 
to a bare licensee, it being immaterial that it would 
cost the owner a very slight effort to make an ef-
fective inspection and that it would be impossible 
for the licensee to make such an inspection in the 
course of his very temporary use of the prem-
ises.''' 
See also De Weese v. J. C. Penney Company, 5 Utah 
2nd 116, 297 P. 2d 898 (1956). In that case, the court held 
that a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its 
patrons. The only basis upon which liability can be 
predicated is negligence; and the standard upon which 
such negligence is gauged is that of ordinary reasonable 
care under the circumstances. The Court went on to 
say that it is particularly fitting that the jury determine 
whether such standard of care has been complied with. 
See also Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 
2nd 365, 284 P. 2d 477 (1955), where the court held, that 
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the owner of a coffee shop was not liable to a patron who 
was injured when he slipped on water on the floor in the 
absence of showing how or when the water got there, or 
that the owner had knowledge of its presence. 
In the case of Pennock v. Newhouse Realty Co., 97 
Utah 408, 93 P. 2d 482 (1939), a judgment for the Plain. 
tiff who was burned by hot grease when he slipped on 
the floor in Defendant's kitchen was reversed on appeal 
by the Supreme Court stating: 
''The mere possession of such grease does not 
impose upon the one in possession the duty of 
affording others protection against injury from 
contact with it. If this were not so, the possession 
of that grease in the center of a ten acre pasture 
would call for protective equipment for the pro-
tection of a passerby outside the pasture. There 
must be some circumstances coupled with the pos-
session that brings the passerby in proximity to a 
dangerous situation." 
This court has heretofore set forth the principle with 
respect to the liability of the owner of premises where 
:1dions are performed by an independent contract in the 
case of (i!eason , .. Salt Lake City. 94 U. 1, 74 P. 2d 1225. 
Tn that case a suit was filed against ~-\_uerbach Company 
and others claiming damages for injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff in tripping over a fire hose lying across 'the 
sidewalk on 3rd South Street in front of the Auerbach 
Department Store. Thl' Auerbach Company had an ele-
vator in its store in the pit of which water had accumu-
lated by leakage of the hydraulic lift aud from the sur-
rounding ground. Its superintendent telephoned the fire 
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department of Salt Lake City and requested that the 
water be pumped from the shaft. In the process of doing 
so, the fire department placed its hose across the side-
walk in front of the store over which the plaintiff tripped 
and fell. The plaintiff claimed that even though the 
actions of the fire department be classed as an independ-
ent contractor, "yet Auerbach Company cannot escape 
liability because the duty of exercisjng due care to guard 
against injuries to pedestrians using the sidewalk is a 
nondelegable duty.'' 
In discussing the general principle relating to a non-
delegable duty, the Court stated: 
"The general rule that the employer of an in-
dependent contractor is not liable for an injury 
resulting to a third person from a tortious act 
committed by himself or his servant is subject to 
three exceptions : 
" ' ( 1) where the injury was the direct result of 
the stipulated work; (2) where that work was in-
trinsically dangerous, and the injury was a con-
sequence of the failure of the contractor to take 
appropriate precautions; (3) where the injury was 
caused by the the nonperformance of an absolute 
duty owed by the employer to the complainant, in-
dividually or to the class of persons to which he 
belongs. 
" 'It follows that, in any of these situations 
the servants of the independent contractor are in 
effect the servants of the principal employer.' " 
- Labatt's Master & Servant, 2d Ed., 127. 
In determining that the defendant Auerbach Com-
pany could not be held liable for the actions of the fire 
department, the court went on to state: 
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''We are convinced the facts of this case cannot 
bring it under either exception of the rule of the 
immunity of an employer where an independent 
contractor does the work. The company did not 
stipulate the doing of the work in the manner 
which caused injury. The request to pump water 
from the elevator shaft did not require any action 
with respect to running a hose, negligently or oth-
erwise, from the curb across the sidewalk. In the 
absence of a showing to· the contrary, we cannot 
assume that the company knew or anticipated that 
such use of the hose for the purpose of priming 
the pump was a necessary part of the procedure. 
''The job of pumping water out of the elevator 
shaft is not such work as in the ordinary course of 
events injurious consequences to pedestrians on a 
sidewalk 200 or 300 feet distant may be expected 
or reasonably anticipated, unless means were 
adopted by which such consequences may be 
prevented.'' 
Of course, Respondents would ha,~e us believe that 
the work in which the Defendant rtah Gas Service Com-
pany was engaged was inherently dangerous. The dif-
ficulty with this position is that Respondents beg the 
question. They assume because an accident happened 
that the work of changing or connecting gas pipes is 
inherently dangerous. The fact is that at the time the 
work was being done there was no gas in the pipes; and 
there was no more danger inYolved than in the perform-
ance of ordinarr plumbing ser-dce. Nor did the explosion 
occur during the performance of such work, which is 
further evidence of the fact that it was not inherently 
dangerous. In 57 C. J. S., J!aster and Servant, Sec. 590, 
p. 362, we find a list of activities which have been held 
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inherently dangerous, as follows : 
"Work held inherently dangerous, within the 
exception, includes: Building of a brick wall abut-
ting on a highway; depositing an insecticide, con-
sisting of a poisonous dust or spray, on a :fiield; 
erection of awnings as appurtenant to a building 
on a much frequneted street in a populous city; 
fumigation of an apartment by gas; installation of 
doors on an elevator shaft where the elevator was 
kept running for the benefit of tenants; propelling 
of gas through mains before the mains were thor-
oughly cemented together; removing a decayed oil 
derrick; and setting off fireworks.'' 
The one case involving use of gas is Chicago Eco-
nomic Fuel Gas Comp(]Jny v. Meyers, 168 Ill. 111, 139, 49 
N. E. 66, where the gas company attempted to run gas 
through its mains before the lines had been properly 
tested. In the instant matter, the testimony of the wit-
nesses as contained in the depositions is conclusive that 
all proper tests were made before the service lines were 
connected to the main line and the gas turned on. 
Too, since the decision of the Meyers case, the use 
of gas in all forms has become widespread and com-
mon. Today the use of natural gas in commercial build-
ings, as well as residences, is well nigh universal where 
natural gas is available. Gasoline is a product which 
has highly explosive qualities but nevertheless is in 
common use by everyone ; and the handling of gasoline is 
not considered as involving an inherently dangerous 
commodity . such as the handling of dynamite or other 
explosives. Of course, the handling of almost any com-
mon commodity may result in creating a dangerous con-
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dition by reason of the manner in which it is handled; 
but such conduct does not render the activity inherently 
dangerous. 
No claim has been made by Respondents that Ap-
pellant did not exercise reasonable care to secure the 
service of a competent and experienced independent con-
tractor. As heretofore pointed out, Defendant Utah Gas 
Service Company is a public utility supervised and di-
rected by the Public Service Commission of the State 
of Utah. Appellant could not have engaged anyone to 
connect the gas to the premises except this Utility and 
therefore cannot be held to be responsible if in the course 
of such public utility work the Gas Company failed to 
exercise reasonable care. 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts sets forth the 
principle of liability in a situation such as this in Section 
415 as follows : 
''A possessor of land who in the course of his 
business holds it open to members of the public, is 
subject to liability- for bodily harm caused to them, 
on a part of the land retained in his possession or 
upon a part thereof leased to a concessionnaire, 
hY his failure to exercise reasonable care to secure 
the use of reasonably safe equipment and methods 
by an 
(a) independent contractor employed to do 
work upon the land while it is held open to the 
publie, or 
(b) independent contractor or concessionnaire 
employed or permitted to carry on upon the land 
an netiYih~ in furtherance of the possessor's busi-
ness use thereof.'' 
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The comment appearing on Page 1125 states the basis 
of the rule as follows : 
"The liability stated in this Section is based 
upon the failure of the possessor of the land in 
question to exercise reasonable care to supervise 
the equipment or methods of his tenant or conces-
sionnaire who carries on an activity which is in-
tended to attract the public to the possessor's land. 
In order that the liability shall exist, it is, there-
fore, necessary that the possessor shall have a rea-
sonable opportunity to ascertain the improper 
equipmen,t or method of his concessionnaire or con,... 
tractor arnd to secure the substitution of safe 
equipment arnd methods. So, too, a shopkeeper who 
employs a contractor to do work in dangerous 
proximity to a part of his shop held open to his 
customers, is not subject to liability under the 
rule stated in this Section for bodily harm suf-
fered by his customers unless the harm is caused 
by the shopkeeper's failure to exercise reasonable 
care to discover and correct dangerous methods of 
work adopted by his contractor. Therefore, the 
rule stated in this Section does not impose liability 
upon the possessor or shopkeeper for harm which 
results from a merely casual act of negligence 
which is not sufficiently persistent to give the pos-
sessor the opportunity to prevent it by the exer-
cise of reasonable care." (Italics added) 
The Restatement gives as an illustration of the rule, 
the situation where A street railway company operates 
an amusement park in which it plans to give a demonstra-
tion of fireworks- the fireworks to be under the direc-
tion of B, an independent contractor. The audience is 
required to maintain a safe distance from the display, but 
a rocket is discharged in a careless and negligent manner 
by an employee of B, thereby injuring C. A street rail-
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way.company is not liable. 
Since there is no question but that Appellant exer-
cised reasonable care to see that the independent con-
tractor used reasonablesafe equipment and methods, she 
cannot be held liable for the acts of the independent 
contractor. 
Respondents have heretofore placed considerable 
emphasis on the principle of law enunciated in Prosser on 
Torts (2d Ed.) p. 357 as follows: 
''The employer of an independent contractor 
may be liable for any negligence of his own in con-
nection with the work to be done. But the common 
law 'rule' has been that he is not liable vicariously 
for the 'torts' of the contractor. To this rule cer-
tain ''exceptions'' have been developed, which in-
dicate a tendency to place the contractor upon the 
same footing as a servant. The more important 
exceptions are : 
''a. Where the employer is under a duty to 
the plaintiff which the law considers that he is not 
free to delegate to the contractor. 
''b. Where the work to be done is inherently 
dangerous to others, or will be dangerous unless 
particular precautions are taken. 
''Even under these exceptions, it is commonly 
held that the employer will be liable only for risks 
inherent in the work itself, and not for 'collateral' 
negligences of the contractor.'· 
liowt'\.l'r, Respondents fail to recognize the dis-
tinction betwPc.'n acts which are inherently dangerous and 
n<'t s which n l'l' mPrPly eollateral to the risk created. This 
is thoroughly discussed by Prosser at pp. 361, 362, as 
follows: 
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''Another distinction, as yet not very exactly 
defined, is the rule generally accepted, that the 
employer is liable only for risks inherent in the 
work itself, and not for 'collateral' or 'casual' 
negligence on the part of the contractor. This doc-
trine, apparently originated in some dicta in an 
English case where, in violation of statutory pro-
vision, the construction of a bridge was permitted 
to delay traffic on a river for more than three 
days. It is very closely connected with the doc-
trine of inherent danger, and seems in reality to 
represent something like a negative statement of it 
. . . The suggestion has been made, therefore, 
that the test of 'collateral' negligence is not its 
character as a minor incident or operative detail 
of the work to be done, but rather its dissocia-
tion from any inherent risk created by the work 
itself. The employer is not liable because the 
negligence is 'collateral' to the risk created -
which is to say, that the performance of the work 
contracted for in the normal manrner contemplated 
by the contract would involve no recognizable risk 
of such harm to the plaintiff, and it is the abnormal 
departure from usual methods by the contractor's 
servants which has created the danger. Where the 
particular risk is involved in the work to be done 
itself, as where the sign is to be painted over the 
sidewalk, the fact that the harm materializes 
through the incidental negligence of the servant 
in dropping the paint bucket will not relieve the 
employer of liability. The distinction is thus one 
between risks inherent in the normal performance 
of the work and those which arise from the abnor-
mal and unusual misconduct of the workmen; and 
it is the latter only which are to be regarded as 
'collateral,' and for which the employer will not 
be held responsible." (Italics added) 
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In the present case, there was nothing hazardous 
about the laying of pipes for the transmission of gas. If 
someone had been injured by the negligent manipulation 
of the pipes, there would be no serious claim that De-
fendant Erma Ransdell would be liable for such action. 
Utah is listed by Prosser as one of the states which 
relieve the owner of premises from liability in situations 
involving collateral negligence. See Callahan v. Salt Lake 
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863. In the Callahan case, the 
city let a street paving contract to an independent con-
tractor. The Supreme Court held that where the city 
did not have a right to interfere with the methods of the 
contractor employed to do the work, it was not liable for 
injuries to property of a third person caused by the neg-
ligence of the contractor. See, also, Glea-son'· Salt Lake 
City, supra. 
In the case of K·ing v. Jlason (La. 95 So. 2nd 705, the 
Plaintiff ·was injured while he was installing a commode in 
the house. The cause of the injury was gas escaping from 
a gas main whieh had been cut and not repaired by in-
dividuals under eontraet with the eity to install sewer 
lines. The gas had seeped along the gas lines and entered 
tl1e house and exploded, injuring Plaintiff. The court 
held the sewer contraetor liable but not the town. The 
town wns not lin hle to the Plaintiff sinee it ,,-as neither a 
party to nor had any notice or knowledge of the tort com-
mit.1<'d hy the sewer contractor and his employees. 
N<'ither did the town's acceptanee of the finished work 
rend<'l' it lia.ble. 
In :25 A. L. R., Page 281, the ease of Schennet·lzorn v. 
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Metropolitan Gaslight Co., (N. Y.) 5 Daly 144, is cited, 
in which case the court held : 
''The loss and injury which the Plaintiff sus-
tained were the result of the negligence of the gas 
fitter and the gas company, the one being the main 
cause of the explosion, and she was entitled to 
hold them both responsible for what occurred. It 
was the gas fitter's negligence that cooperated 
with the negligence of the Defendant in producing 
the accident; for what the Plaintiff, or rather her 
husband did- the sending for a gas fitter when 
he found that gas was escaping- was not a neg-
ligent, but a prudent act.'' 
In 18 .Am. Jur. "ELECTRICITY," Section 58, ap-
pears the following discussion with respect to contracts 
involving the installation of electricity : 
''In ascertaining the liability for injuries from 
electric wires or appliances, it is often important 
to determine whether the person whose negligence 
was responsible for the injury was an independent 
contractor, the general rule being that (Jfn em-
ployer is not liable for the negligence of his inde-
pendent contractor or the latter's servants. Thus, 
an expert employed to test motors and an electric 
lighting company employed to install a trans-
former and to make iron pipe framework connec-
tions in a traction company's substation ha.ve been 
held to be independent contractors. There are, 
however, circumstances under which duties are 
imposed upon one which he cannot delegate to 
another. Where an absolute obligation is imposed 
upon a city to attend itself to the matter of wiring, 
responsibility for any defectiveness in the wiring 
rests upon the city although the practice had been 
to leave everything in that connection to an in-
dependent contractor; and an electric company by 
subcontracting the performance of its obligations, 
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may not escape responsibility · for a nuissance 
created by the operation of its powerhouse." 
(Italics added) · . 
In view of the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the 
lower court erred in granting a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of liability. 
PoiNT II. 
UNDER THE PLEADINGS OF THIS CASE 
APPELLANT HAS THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY 
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY. 
The right to trial by jury in this State is a funda-
mental right. Article I, Sec. 10, Constitution of Utah. 
It is provided by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, R'Ule 
38 (a): 
''Right Preserved: The right of trial by jury 
as declared by the constitution or as given by 
statute shall be preserved to the parties.'' 
Section 78-21-1, U. C. A., 1953, provides: 
''In actions for the recoYery of ... damages 
... for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a 
jury, unless a jury trial is waived .... '' 
Respondents urge that ..._-\..ppellant is not entitled to 
a jury trial on the issue of liability because she has ad-
mitted the liability of the Gas Company and thereby has 
admitted her own liability in the matter. However, there 
has never been a determination by the jury as to the 
specifie ad8 of negligence of which the Gas Company 
was held rC'sponsible. Obviously, even under Respond-
ents' position in this matter, Appellant could not be held 
liable for every act of negligence which the Gas Company 
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may have been guilty of, particularly with respect to 
those which under the authorities heretofore cited are 
"collateral" to any duty owed by the owner of property 
to an invitee. The reason for this is obvious. Until there 
has been a determination that Appellant has breached a 
duty which she owes to the public, there can be no liability 
charged to her. In her Answer, Appellant specifically 
denied that she had breached any duty which she owed 
to the public and therefore she is entitled to have a jury 
determine whether in truth and in fact such a duty has 
been breached either by her own acts or by the acts of a 
third person for which she may be held liable. Until 
Respondents have established by a finding of the jury that 
the breach of duty or negligence of the Gas Company was 
such that the same would be imputed to Appellant in 
this case, there can be no determination by summary 
judgment that she was negligent. 
A good statement of the principle involved is found 
in the case of General Investment Co. v. Interborough 
Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216, where 
the court of appeals of New York held: 
''The rule in question is simply one regulating 
and prescribing procedure, whereby the court may 
summarily determine whether or not a bona fide 
issue exists between the parties to the action. A 
determination by the court that such issue is pre-
sented requires the denial of an application for 
summary judgment and trial of the issue by jury 
at the election of either party. On the other hand, 
if the pleadings and affidavits of plaintiff disclose 
that no defense exists to the cause of action, and 
a defendant, as in the instant case, fails to contro-
vert such evidence and establish by affidavit or 
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proof that it has a real defense and should be per-
mitted to defend, the court may determine that 
no issue triable by jury exists between the parties 
and grant a summary judgment.'' 
While the court in that case held that the pleadings 
and affidavits of the plaintiffs did disclose that no defense 
existed to the cause of action, we are not in the same posi-
tion in this case for the reason that the pleadings and 
depositions in this case do not show what specific acts of 
negligence Defendant Utah Gas Service Company was 
guilty of and therefore what acts, if any, the Defendant 
Erma Ransdell may be charged with being responsible 
for. See, also, Lundberg v. Backnwn, 9 Ut. 2d 58, 337 
P. 2d 433. 
PorNT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IX REFrSIXG TO ALLOW 
APPELL~~NT TO FILE ~~ CLARIFYING AMEND-
MEXT TO HER ~.\.NSWER. 
Appellant timely applied to the trial court for per-
mission to file a clarifying amendment to her Answer so 
as to set clearlY before the court the facts as she under-
stood them. R.ule 15 (a)~ [~talz Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides as follows : 
"(a) Amendments: ~.\. party may amend his 
pleading once as a matter of course any time be-
fore n responsin~ pleading is filed, or if the plead-
ing is one to which no responsin? pleading is per-
mitted and the action has not been placed upon 
thP tJ·inl rnl<-~ndnr, he may so amend it after 20 
dnrs after serYed. Other":ise, a party may amend 
his p h'<Hling only b~- lea ,.e of court or by \\Titten 
consent of tht:• a(h·erse parties; and l eare sluill be 
freely giren tDhen. justice so requires." (Italics 
added) 
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In the case of Murray v. Miller, 1 U. 2d 43, 261 P. 2d 
950, this Court held : 
''It is well recognized in this and other juris-
dictions both under code pleadings and the new 
rules that a complaint may be amended in order 
to clarify the issues at trial at the discretion of 
the trial court. Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; Keller v. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P. 2d 
562 ; Sara gent v. Union Fuel Co., 37 Utah 392, 
108 P. 928; Grover v. Cash, 69 Utah 194, 253 
P. 676." 
Again we refer the Court to Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 6, p. 2055 : 
"Where leave of court is necessary for the 
amendment of a pleading, Rule 15 (a) states that 
'leave shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires.' And Rule 15 (b) provides liberally for 
amendments to conform to the evidence. Since a 
summary judgment is an adjudication on the 
merits and because of Rule 15, it is the duty of the 
trial court freely to allow amendments to the 
pleadings, unless the application to amend smacks 
of diliatory tactics or in some other respect fails 
to further justice. The general admonition has 
been stated by Judge Clark in Rossiter v. Vogel: 
" 'where facts appear in affidavits upon mo-
tion for a summary judgment which would 
justify an amendment of the pleadings, such 
amendment should not be prevented by the 
entry of a final judgment.' 
"Indeed at times it will be feasible and desir-
able to treat the pleading as though it were amend-
ed to conform to the facts set forth in the affidavits. 
The court has the power to condition leave to 
amend upon a showing that the amendment has 
substantial merit. 
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''As illustrative of the· rule generally .per-
taining to granting leave to amend, a COIIlplaint 
. should not be summarily dismissed if there is rea-
sonable ground for the belief that in the reframing 
of the complaint a good cause of action may be 
stated~ And on a plaintiff's motion for surn.mary 
judgment made after the defendant had answered, 
if defenses are raised in affidavits which raise 
"triable issues and would prevent the plaintiff from 
recovering, the court should not. succumb • to the 
argument that they have been waived by failure 
to plead them, but should at least allow the answer 
to be amended. Similar principles should govern 
to permit a defendant to move for summary judg-
ment on the basis of a defense not pleaded in his 
answer.'' 
It is clear from a reading of the pleadings in the cases 
now before this Court that Appellant Ransdell did not 
admit she was negligent merely because she admitted 
that Utah Gas Service Company was negligent. In fact, 
as the record now discloses, she brought an action against 
the Utah Gas Service Company for the injuries which 
she received upon the theory that the Utah Gas Service 
Company was liable to her for its negligence. The allega-
tions of negligence on the part of the Utah Gas Service 
Company in the complaint which Appellant Erma Rans-
dell filed in the Federal District Court are the same alle-
gations of negligence on the part of the Utah Gas Service 
Company which she admitted in her answer in the instant 
cases. Obviously she referred to, and the facts will 
show, acts of negligence on the part of the Utah Gas Serv-
ice Company whieh as a matter of law could not be 
imputed to her. Indeed, it mny be asserted that the acts 
complained of did not relate to any matter with respect 
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to which Appellant owed a duty to the public which was 
violated. 
Until that matter has been resolved by the jury 
against Erma Ransdell, Respondents are not entitled to 
recover in this case. If there is any doubt as to the inten-
tion of Appellant in respect to her Answer filed herein, 
then the proposed amendment should be allowed in order 
to clarify her position. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the negligence 
alleged on the part of the Defendant Utah Gas Service 
Company by Respondents in their respective complaints, 
should not as a matter of law be imputed to Appellant; 
that unless and until a jury has found that Appellant was 
negligent either in fact or by law from a finding of spe-
cific acts of negligence on the part of Utah Gas Service 
Company which would be imputed to her, she should not 
be held to respond for damages to the Respondents. 
Should there be any doubt in the mind of the court 
regarding the sufficiency of the pleadings, then and in that 
event Appellant should be permitted to file her amend-
ment to her Answer so that her position will be clearly 
and fairly stated before the trial of the matter and the 
issue of liability presented squarely to the trial of the fact. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
ELIAS L. DAY 
ELLIOTT LEE PRAT'l, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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